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Abstract: This chapter draws on literature about courts, constitutionalism, and legal 
mobilisation in and around authoritarian regimes. It adopts both the notion of the 
continuing importance of the constitutional ‘moment’, and the concept of legal 
mobilisation as one form of contestation and resistance, to explain and explore some of 
the particular meanings that law, lawyers, and legal activism acquired before, during and 
beyond the Chilean transition of 1990. Interpreting legal mobilisation against the 
backdrop of prevailing legal-cultural traditions, the chapter contends both that the 
authoritarian regime´s constitution-making moment of 1980 should be viewed as the 
foundational critical juncture of Chile’s past three decades; and that subsequent ‘rights 
talk’ in Chile has been hamstrung by its obeisance to conceptions of legality that hark 
back to this phase of the dictatorship. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Recent literature on authoritarian regimes has shed considerable light on the 
various ways in which authoritarian powerholders attempt to resolve the twin dilemmas 
of social control and intra-elite coordination/ power sharing (see, inter alia, Svolik 2012).  
Some authors attend principally to the role in this task of parties, legislatures, periodic 
elections, and other political practices often superficially associated with democracies 
(Gandhi 2008, Levitsky and Way 2002, etc.).  A strong focus on courts and the operation 
of law is however also visible in this literature, a useful reminder that judicialization of 
politics is by no means unique to liberal democracy (see for example Ginsburg and 
Moustafa, eds., 2008). Logically enough, these two strands of interest converge where 
authoritarian regimes indulge or have indulged in constitution-making, particularly where 
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constitutional courts are part of the mix (Ginsburg and Simpser, eds., Barros 2002, 
Moustafa 2007).1  In this respect, a previous conventional wisdom holding that 
authoritarian constitutions can be dismissed as mere window dressing, seems to be giving 
way to an equally conventional wisdom that they cannot (See for example Ginsburg and 
Simpser, op.cit., pp 5-9). While this concern is largely focused on the power of such 
constitutions to constrain the regime itself, the question of ‘overhang’ of authoritarian 
constitutions into post-transitional practice is perhaps prefigured, given what de Sousa 
Santos aptly describes as the “imprint” of old laws.2 
Moustafa (2007) moreover argues convincingly that courts at all levels – 
including constitutional ones - can under certain circumstances become a “unique field 
of contention” within authoritarian states (op. cit.: 20).  As well as their obvious 
significance as a venue for the playing out of elite visions (and sometimes disputes), they 
may also be open to, or prised opened by, actors who clearly do not fit the intra-elite 
characterisation. With respect to the first of these functions, Moustafa reminds us that 
political economy concerns often underpin drives to establish limited legal autonomy – 
or, at least, predictability – even in otherwise highly personalist authoritarian regimes.3  
With regard to the second function, he describes how courts and legal mobilisation may 
emerge as an arena of resistance to authoritarian regimes. Political activists and others 
may be forced by the closing of oppositional space to seek alliance with legal activists; 
even when such actors themselves enjoy only precarious standing or toleration (Moustafa 
op. cit.).   
These discussions - of authoritarian self-configuration, and of legal activism as an 
attempt to contend with authoritarianism - may speak especially to anyone with a 
particular interest in Chile, a case discussed by all of the aforementioned authors. In 
regard to the first issue, late C20 Chile is perhaps a prime example of authoritarian 
constitution-making as an exercise in political legitimation and intra-elite bargaining, 
responding to a particular vision of political economy. As is well known, the 1973-90 
Chilean dictatorship introduced, in 1980, an authoritarian constitution enshrining a 
neoliberal economic model. Both have enjoyed considerable subsequent longevity.  As 
                                                          
1 Although Aguilar and Rios Figueroa (2014) rightly point out that while the relationships between 
authoritarianism and institutions, and between authoritarianism and judicial politics, have been studied, 
these studies too rarely dialogue with one another. 
2  “[L]egal revocation is not social revocation” (De Sousa Santos 1987: 282).  In cases such as the one that 
concerns us, Chile, transition moreover did not trigger either type of revocation. 
3 See, in general, ´new institutionalist´ approaches and the ‘law and development’ movement as 
characterised, and critiqued, in Moustafa op. cit. 21-25 and chapter 7.  
regards legally-framed contention and contestation, the Chilean dictatorship´s open use 
of extreme repression, particularly in its early years, gave rise to resistance in the form of 
a vocal and active human rights movement. Indeed, as Dezalay and Garth (2002) rightly 
remark, “human rights [concerns] and neoliberal economics” were perhaps the two 
principal features propelling Chile to international attention, whether approbatory or 
otherwise, during this period.4 Human rights activism was moreover notably legally 
framed, despite the relatively unyielding attitude of a judicial branch, and indeed a legal 
profession, which were largely supportive of the regime (see Collins 2010b; 2013: 67-
70). 
This chapter adopts both the notion of the continuing importance of the 
constitutional ‘moment’, and the insight about legal mobilisation as one form of 
contestation and resistance, to explain and explore some of the particular meanings that 
law, lawyers, and legal activism acquired before, during and beyond the Chilean transition 
of 1990. Interpreting legal mobilisation against the backdrop of prevailing legal-cultural 
traditions, the chapter contends both that the authoritarian regime´s constitution-making 
moment of 1980 should be viewed as the foundational critical juncture of Chile’s past 
three decades; and that subsequent ‘rights talk’ in Chile has been hamstrung by its 
obeisance to conceptions of legality that hark back to this phase of the dictatorship era. 
Truly critical legal traditions such as might have given birth to a more established and 
ideologically transversal modern rights movement, and/or to a more effective campaign 
for post-transitional constitutional replacement, have struggled to establish themselves. 
This is due in part to a transversally conservative discourse that has come to accept as 
natural not only the economic and social precepts of the 1973-1990 period (more 
properly, the period from 1980-90),5 but also the underlying depiction of 1970-73 as an 
exceptional, and dangerous, departure from hallowed traditions.6 
                                                          
4 Dezalay and Garth (2002:141) and see more generally the entire chapter, pp.141-160. See also, for the 
treatment of Chile’s human rights emergency by international organisations and exile networks, Ensalaco 
2010 or Angell 2013.  
5 Dezalay and Garth (op.cit.), like Angell (2006), Huneeus (2007) and many others, have pointed out that 
while Chile is often cited as the classic or a particularly extreme example of the twinning of authoritarian 
politics and neoliberal conversion, neoliberal precepts were fully installed only towards the end of the 
1970s, as the regime cast around for an economic policy direction and more traditional contenders lost 
the dispute for influence.  A banking collapse and generalised economic crisis in 1983-85 was moreover 
dealt with in ways that departed substantially from neoliberal precepts.  
6 Thus the dictatorship – in many ways the instigator of the most profound and radical cultural 
transformation of Chile’s republican history – claimed legitimation, and calmed fears, by conjuring 
associations with stability rather than rupture. Pinochet, for example, missed no opportunity to evoke 
associations with figures from Chile’s pantheon of national ‘heroes’, mostly military strongmen associated 
The chapter is chronologically organised. It first briefly characterises the 
traditions of legalism, legal practice, and statecraft for which the 1970 elected socialist 
government of Salvador Allende and the violent military coup of 1973 both represented, 
in their different ways, a rude awakening. Second, it shows how the dictatorial regime’s 
approaches to institutionalisation and self-legitimation in general, and specifically to its 
deployment of coercive violence, challenged and reshaped the legal profession and the 
relationship of a newly-emerging class of human rights lawyers to the judiciary. Third, 
the chapter discusses the pros and cons of Chile’s model of controlled transition, in which 
although openly repressive behaviour was discontinued, there was relatively little formal 
or substantive institutional or constitutional change. Finally, the chapter addresses the 
place of law and legal activism in present-day human rights debates, including although 
not limited to remaining transitional justice challenges.7   
 
2.  The legal profession in pre-dictatorship Chile: the historical roots of Chilean 
legalism  
 
A full history of law and legal practice in Chile, as indeed of its judicial practice, 
undoubtedly exceeds the scope of this chapter. Nonetheless some preliminary remarks 
may help to situate later developments. At the risk of oversimplification, it is reasonable 
to take as a starting premise that the commonplace characterisation of Chile as legalistic 
has some basis in fact.  Thus Chile’s national self-image, cultivated since formal 1810 
independence from Spain, includes the belief that republican and constitutionalist 
traditions set it apart from many of its neighbours, and encompasses a strong commitment 
to the notion of law. This helps explain why lawyers and legal framings were symbolically 
and practically important during and after 1973-1990 authoritarian rule, as they had been 
before it; and also why, as Huneeus (2007) points out, the Pinochet regime, though highly 
personalised, was not arbitrary, preferring to reshape or rewrite the rule book rather than 
to openly disregard the concept of rule-boundedness.  
Chile is, then, often and rightly characterised as a legalistic society which values 
the principles of law, or at least of predictable order. While the malleability of legal 
                                                          
with independence or with C19 statebuilding: see Joignant (2007; 2013). However see also Loveman and 
Lira (1999; 2000), for strands of genuine continuity in authoritarian repression and legal toleration of it. 
7 For the purposes of what follows, ‘transitional justice’ challenges are defined as those arising from direct 
or indirect connection with the truth, justice, reparations, and guarantees of non-repetition legacies of 
dictatorship-era human rights violations.  
outcomes is recognised, law itself is demonstrably not regarded as an endlessly fickle, 
inevitably corrupted, or essentially fictitious restraint on behaviour, even on the behaviour 
of the powerful. Serious questioning of the intrinsic legitimacy of the legal paradigm is 
therefore reasonably scarce, and such belief in law is often accompanied by an equally 
unwavering commitment to a strong unitary state.8 A highly centralising, law-bound state 
emerged soon after independence, largely constructed by Diego Portales, an influential 
early C19 statesman. There was little or nothing of a liberal cast in this legality: the 
Portalean state, decidedly republican and more than somewhat repressive, has been 
described as ‘legal dictatorship’ or ‘presidential authoritarianism’, prefiguring the 
Pinochet regime.9  
Lawyers and the legal profession historically had the central role in national life 
that one might expect given such a characterisation, until relatively recent modernising 
trends began to reshape or even challenge law’s perception of itself as the country’s pre-
eminent ‘public profession’.  Iñigo de la Maza (n/d; 2001) describes lawyers as Chile’s 
‘statesmen par excellence’ from the mid-C19.  Between 1843 and 1950, 18 of 20 national 
presidents, most ministers, and most Senators were lawyers (de la Maza, n/d, p. 10). A 
Bar Association was formed in 1925, and affiliation to it and its code of ethics were made 
compulsory in 1941. Law, seen as a respectable and at the same time a forward-looking 
profession, was held in high regard among students from middle-class families with 
aspirations, considered a sure route to a future in high-level public service. 
However, industrialisation and the professionalisation of statecraft began to 
displace lawyers from the high offices of government, sending the profession into relative 
decline: from statesmen, in the mid C19, to hired hands, by the mid C20. Law ceased to 
be a civic vocation, becoming ‘a business like any other’, according to de la Maza (n/d, 
p.15). Lawyers set up private firms or chambers, reinventing themselves as a professional 
service sector for emerging commercial interests (de la Maza 2001).  Modernisation 
theory and accompanying notions about the necessary economic and social preconditions 
for development also played a part. By the 1960s positivistic approaches from the new 
social sciences – sociology, and to some extent economics – were in the ascendant as 
                                                          
8 Post-transitional regionalising reforms seeking greater devolution or autonomy have gained little 
purchase, and there seems to be little appetite for legal pluralism. Chile is for example one of few 
remaining countries in the region not to enshrine any form of indigenous identity rights or self-
determination rights, having made substantive and unilateral reservations to ILO 169 provisions that have 
elsewhere underwritten such developments.  
9 Portales was one of the historical figures for whom Pinochet repeatedly professed public and fervent 
admiration. 
arbiters of national life, heralding a love affair with technocracy that would reach its 
apogee during the dictatorship. Law was ‘out’ and sociology was ‘in’.  Over the course 
of the same decade, legal education reforms aimed at reversing the increasing 
marginalisation of the profession by broadening legal training were abandoned.  Would-
be donors and advisors from the US gave up on their efforts to carve out a middle course 
between radicalisms by cajoling Chilean legal education, and thereby legal practice, away 
from its determinedly fusty habits (Dezalay and Garth 2002). 
The ‘socialist experiment’ of Salvador Allende’s Popular Unity government, from 
1970, accentuated the dislodging of legal traditionalists, indeed traditionalists of all sorts, 
from the helm of state administration.  Allende himself was a medic, itself a departure 
from the frequent circulation of lawyers into and out of the highest office of state.  Modern 
and modernising sciences, this time of a more Marxist hue, became the administration’s 
trusted guides on the electoral road to socialism. Dependency theory in economics, and 
its counterparts and derivatives in social, industrial and even cultural policy were 
espoused with enthusiasm. Allende clashed repeatedly with the Supreme Court, which 
having been reluctant to ratify his election, went on to oppose some of his more radical 
transformations, often by questioning their compatibility with the 1925 Constitution.10 
The anti-privilege, pro-poor thrust of the new government’s rhetoric and actions was 
anathema to a substantial part of the existing establishment. The legal establishment, in 
particular, was threatened by various developments including a project to introduce 
alternative ‘popular courts’, among other policy proposals that would in effect have put 
an end to the Bar Association’s previous monopoly on the provision of subsidised legal 
aid to poor communities (Gonzalez Le Saux 2014). 
Centre-right currents among Chile’s judicial and legal-professional classes may 
have shared Popular Unity’s concern for the poor, but were increasingly alienated by its 
revolutionary identity and methods. When Chile’s traditional ‘three thirds’ left-centre-
right political pattern finally fractured under the strain, the Christian Democrats who 
Allende had displaced by a narrow margin in the 1970 election sided with the right and 
the military.  Judges, senior lawyers, businesspeople, and pillars of the (previous) 
established order of all kinds, supported and indeed in many cases actively promoted the 
coup. Their misplaced belief was that it would usher in a return to business as usual, ie a 
                                                          
10 Including the emblematic nationalisation of the copper industry, plus various types and tranches of land 
and other asset expropriation.  
restoration of their former influence, and a reassertion of the rules of the game that 
stretched back to the 1925 Constitution and beyond.   
Although the 1973 coup initially pleased many judges and other legal 
professionals, in the end it did nothing to reverse their generalised professional or public 
decline. Economists, rather than lawyers, became the new policy mandarins, particularly 
once the Chicago Boys school of monetarist economic thinkers came into the ascendant 
after 1975. Party politics, even right wing party politics, was dispensed with.  While some 
legal expertise was needed in the exalted inner circle, not least to craft the regime’s epoch-
changing 1980 Constitution, a relatively small group of ultra-loyal Catholic University-
affiliated gremialistas, headed by principal regime ideologue Jaime Guzmán, fulfilled 
this function.  The broader legal profession continued to be relegated to a relatively 
narrow understanding of its role, as one more service corps within a shrinking state and 
an expanding market. Legal education was de-monopolised, with a raft of new private 
universities allowed to offer law training. Although this increased the profession’s sheer 
weight of numbers, it also entailed a certain de-mystification and (to some) a concomitant 
reduction in the profession’s social prestige, rooted as it had been in class stratification 
and high entry barriers.11  Law schools, like other university faculties, were subjected to 
censorship and direct control by the military regime, but law schools per se had never 
been, and did not subsequently become, hotbeds of radicalism or radical opposition. This 
was a role more often inhabited by the social sciences, some of which were as a result 
simply abolished for the duration of the dictatorship. 
Lawyers’ collective loyalty or at least relative meekness was hardly rewarded, 
however. Compulsory Bar Association affiliation was abolished, removing at a stroke the 
profession’s central visible platform from which to take a stand on national affairs.  This 
action was quite in keeping with the regime’s strong strategic and ideological distrust of 
associations of all kinds, but was not at all what Association stalwarts had envisaged when 
imagining restoration of their former glory and privileges after the Allende period.  In 
short, while legalism remained a force to be reckoned with, the gentleman-lawyers of 
yesteryear were not returned to what some at least still conceived of as their rightful place 
at the heart of public institutional life. Legal professionals, like other professionals, were 
to be employed at the pleasure of the market, rather than enjoying sinecures in high-level 
                                                          
11 Previously only a small number of highly traditional law faculties produced the lion’s share of the 
country’s elite lawyers, a pattern which to some extent still persists.  
public administration.  The content of constitutional law, and the institutional scaffolding 
of law’s interpretation and application, was meanwhile appropriated to become the direct 
concern of the regime in at least two senses: firstly, as a source of intra-elite control, 
legitimation, and coveted legal capital, and secondly, as a stage for the playing out of 
‘moral opposition’ framed in the language of universal rights. 
  
3. Courts, coercion and human rights lawyering during the Pinochet regime: 1973-
1990  
 
The substantial deference of the Chilean courts to the Pinochet dictatorship, which 
included seemingly wilful blindness to its wholesale criminality, is generally recognised.  
Some hold that a traditionally positivistic or formalistic approach to law on the part of 
Chilean judges was to blame. Hilbink (2007) however suggests that a quite particular 
judicial understanding of apoliticism was also in play, one which saw matters of public 
or constitutional law as properly for others to resolve. The possibility that many judges, 
like a good proportion of the population, were simply favourably disposed to, and in 
agreement with, military intervention is perhaps too often overlooked. Nonetheless, 
Barros (2002) and Huneeus (2007) inter alia have shown that over the course of the 17-
year period Chile’s courts were not a mere fiction or flag of convenience, given the 
regime’s preference for ruling through, rather than in spite of, law.  This penchant for 
seeking legal as well as economic and historical legitimacy was expressed in 1980 in a 
new authoritarian constitution, combined with the granting of exceptionally broad powers 
to the constitutional tribunal (first introduced in 1970, under the Allende government).  
In this way, although the content of law was from then on shaped to the regime’s 
satisfaction at the highest level, the corresponding weight of judicial pronouncements 
regarding it was also potentially greater. Indeed, it was this same custom-made 
constitutional framework that was eventually enforced to oblige Pinochet to respect the 
results of his own plebiscite and hand over power in 1990. In specific regard to regime-
sponsored repression, the operation of the courts placed judges potentially in everyday 
proximity to the agencies and victims of repression.12  Over time the courts moreover 
increasingly became, despite themselves, a target venue for lawyers and civil society 
                                                          
12 The fact that the criminal justice system was a magistrate-driven inquisitorial system, with judges rather 
than prosecutors or police formally directing investigations from the start, accentuates this point.  
groups seeking to construct ‘rightful resistance’ (O’Brien 1996).  These efforts, largely 
fruitless in strictly formal terms, nonetheless further encouraged the regime to use 
‘containment techniques’, including control of judicial appointments and expansion of 
military court jurisdiction, in an attempt to pre-empt possibly unwelcome judicial 
activism.13  
This section examines the currents that shaped these dynamics as the regime 
evolved. It argues that during the regime’s most overtly repressive period, from 1973-
78,14 judicial acquiescence was cultivated by a deft mix of appeals to the exigencies of 
immediate circumstances and to tradition, combined with the siloing of the most violent 
manifestations of state terror into a self-regulating containment and facilitation system. 
That system was composed of specially-created, irregular (therefore deniable) security 
services, overseen, if at all, by pliable military courts. In this way, what Carlos Huneeus 
(2007) aptly calls “voluntary synchronisation” of the ordinary court system to the regime 
was encouraged and further facilitated, by relegating the least palatable manifestations of 
repressive violence to a ‘twin track’.  The creation of this parallel system within and 
between the justice and security sectors allowed the regime to render mass violations less 
visible while still enjoying the coordination and legitimation benefits accruing from not 
openly suspending or closing down the judicial branch.15 The possible opportunity costs 
arising from having to reckon with an unwieldy, geographically extensive, and semi-
autonomous court apparatus theoretically able to expose or trammel repressive or other 
extra-legal activity were contained through a mix of appeasement, coercion, and the 
dualistic architecture already mentioned.16  The ordinary courts, at the highest level, 
proved not at all unwilling to connive with this strategy, voluntarily renouncing their 
supervisory responsibilities vis a vis military courts at the first opportunity and making 
no subsequent move to wrest even the most flagrant incident of regime violence against 
                                                          
13 Policzer (2009) discusses in detail how the regime continually monitored and rebalanced its 
containment strategies, alternately targeting intra-regime actors, semi-autonomous entities such as the 
courts, and extra-regime actors including the Catholic Church and the press. The decision as to whether 
to control, coerce, or persuade into acquiescence could vary over time, inter alia according to the real and 
perceived costs of each alternative. 
14 This is the period into which over 90% of the 3,000-plus deaths and disappearances caused by the 
regime were concentrated. See Collins (2010). 
15 These benefits included the opportunity to use the appearance of liberal legality as a fig leaf on the 
international stage, given the prevailing Cold War context. 
16 As regards coercion, there was an early purge of magistrate and judicial employees, whose magnitude 
is often underestimated or simply overlooked: see Gallardo Silva (2003).  
civilians away from military jurisdiction.17  Thus, pace Shapiro (1981) – but see Shapiro 
2008 - social control – at least, violent social control - in Chile’s early authoritarian period 
was exercised directly by security agencies as much as or more than through the courts, 
particularly the civilian courts. The preferential use of ad hoc repressive agencies, 
reporting directly to Pinochet, moreover served to minimise or eliminate internal dissent, 
sharpen personalised control, and ensure loyalty by neutralising squeamishness among 
officer ranks of the regular armed forces about the dirtier tactics of the dirty war (see 
Svolik 2012).18 
Why go to the trouble of creating special channels and institutions to first 
dissemble, and then largely legalise, repressive violence and the about change in 
economic and social policy that ensued?  Continued rule by simple diktat, or open terror, 
might have seemed superficially easier to engineer for a regime with unquestioned control 
of firepower and no serious, certainly no armed, opposition to reckon with.  However, 
Huneeus perceptively reminds us that “Chile’s long and strong legal tradition…. was a 
required reference point for the new rulers, since the country’s […] state of law and 
judicial order [was] the source of enormous [national] pride” (2007: 149). An evident 
break with this tradition would therefore have risked alienating the considerable popular 
support the military’s actions had enjoyed up to that point. Rule of law language, 
combined with rule by law behaviour, offered the optimum strategy for the circumstances. 
It also allowed the regime to lay claim to historical legitimacy by portraying the recently 
truncated Allende presidency, rather than their own clearly unconstitutional seizure of 
power, as extra-legal, arbitrary, and lawless.  Hilbink accordingly describes the period 
between the coup and the new 1980 Constitution as “the rule of law show” (2007:106), 
highlighting the obvious discrepancies between the rule of law justifications offered for 
seizing power, and the actions subsequently taken.  It is worth noting, however, that even 
when the regime was still an improvising military junta rather than the fully fledged 
                                                          
17 One additional hidden cost of thus allowing the civilian courts to feign genuine ignorance of the full 
implications of repression was adverted to early on, when the regime’s (civilian) justice minister warned 
the military junta, in the early 1970s, that allowing the Supreme Court to formally abdicate its oversight 
over courts martial would lead to “blame falling solely on the armed forces”. Letter to the junta, cited in 
Huneeus 2007:55. 
18 Thus for example Oscar Bonilla, a general killed in a helicopter crash in the early period of the regime, 
is widely rumoured to have been assassinated due to his principled opposition to the murderous tactics 
of the DINA secret police. Constitutionalist Air Force General Alberto Bachelet, father of the outgoing 
Chilean president Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010 and 2014-2018), died in prison as a result of torture 
inflicted by his own former comrades in arms, as did numerous armed forces personnel who remained 
loyal to the deposed government, or simply questioned the deployment of repressive violence, after 1973.  
authoritarian refoundational project it became, existing law was appropriated, shaped and 
modified rather than solely flouted or dispensed with.  The issue of immediate tools for 
ruling was cleverly resolved by an announced return to the 1925 Constitution, combined 
with exploitation of all its powers and states of exception to cobble together an effective 
‘legal dictatorship’ which did not appear – because it was not – wholly invented.  
The active approval of the Supreme Court clearly made this task easier, and its 
rhetorical claims more convincing, and some of this approval almost certainly proceeded 
from the fact that the bulk of the senior judiciary, like a good proportion of the population, 
genuinely supported what they understood the regime’s project to be.  That this project 
openly espoused authoritarianism, and clearly entailed at least some initial level of 
violence, would not necessarily place it beyond the pale nor indeed outwith the nation’s 
previous lived experience. As Loveman and Lira (1999; 2000; 2002, and 2013) have 
shown, depictions of the Pinochet dictatorship as an exceptional departure from a 
peaceable, constitution-respecting republican history amount to little more than 
revisionist myth-making.  Authoritarian government, authoritarian traits within 
constitutional, elected governments, and repressive policing and security force practices 
were, they show, recurring features of C19 and C20 Chilean statecraft. The mere 
perpetration of a certain quota of politically deployed violence was not, in other words, 
necessarily sufficient in itself to undermine any pretension to legitimacy. Moreover, as 
we have seen, the regime had declared, early on, that the government it had deposed – 
and with which the Supreme Court had repeatedly and very publicly quarrelled – had 
“placed itself outside the law” and “fallen into flagrant illegitimacy”.19   
The regime’s early discourse moreover promised not the radical ideological 
(neoliberal) project eventually espoused, but a high-minded, disinterested interregnum, 
seeking only to halt what it regarded as the decadence of recent years. Blame for this 
supposed decadence, polarisation, and chaos was moreover laid at the feet not only of 
international Marxism but of politics in general, and civilian politicians of all stripes, in 
particular.20  Symbolic bolstering of the regime’s own claim to power thereby came 
through an apolitical or antipolitical discourse, combined with an appeal to hallowed 
traditions, of which apparent obeisance to law and rational order was one. Having used 
defence of law as part-justification for the 1973 coup, law was a useful device with which 
                                                          
19 Bando (Edict) No.5, issued by the military junta in September 1973. 
20 Thus even loyal supporters were not to be trusted, or allowed, to form actual political parties again until 
many years hence. 
to pretend or to believe that nothing essential had changed after the coup, except for the 
better. The regime managed to construct and promote the view that direct military rule 
represented the rescuing of Chile’s honoured traditions. In this version, the 1970-73 
Popular Unity government, rather than the authoritarian one installed by force in 1973, 
represented exceptionalism, anarchy and lawlessness.   
This discourse could not fail to chime with the judiciary, the only branch of state 
to avoid overt usurpation of its functions by the military Junta. Since the higher judiciary, 
essentially conservative, believed this conservatism to be genuinely and appropriately 
apolitical, an antipolitical discourse could not but chime with their own sense that politics 
was the enemy of transcendent public duty and, just possibly, the antithesis of law. This 
conservatism was not necessarily due to any innate right-wing sympathies: indeed, as 
Hilbink (2007) convincingly shows and Gonzalez le Saux (2014) also implies, apoliticism 
was an acquired characteristic socialised into a largely solidly sociologically middle-class 
group.21 Self-preserving corporate hostility to the Allende era had played a recent part, 
leading the Supreme Court to temporarily set aside its own longstanding tradition of 
deference to the executive in weighty matters of public law. That tradition of deference 
now reasserted itself with a vengeance, neatly circumventing any need for the regime’s 
early promise to respect judicial autonomy ‘insofar as the current situation allows’ to be 
put to any real test.   
The courts did, of course, become drawn in gradually to certain of the 
authoritarian control and co-ordination problems, both internal and external, that began 
to emerge as the new de facto regime gradually became normalised and the courts 
continued to go about their everyday tasks. However, the arbitration of economic and 
other divergent interests amongst in-groups basically allied with the regime was not a 
particularly highly exposed or politicizing task.22 Pinochet, rapidly emerging as the 
principal regime powerholder, moreover resorted to tactics and instances other than 
judges and the law to concentrate power in his own hand and enforce acquiescence. 
                                                          
21 The judicial profession in Chile had long been, and remains, a specific career choice with its own basic 
level training. To be a judge, even a senior one, is accordingly not necessarily associated with selection 
from the higher echelons of successful or elite legal practice, as is commonly the case in, for instance, the 
UK. 
22 It is no coincidence that when it became so – ie when the 1980 Constitution was crafted, inter alia in an 
effort to provide a forum for containing and resolving differences of vision and emphasis within the newly-
configured civil-military elite -  the pre-existing Constitutional Tribunal was reshaped, via changes to 
composition and powers, to play this role of loyal rebalancing (See, for a general study of the Tribunal 
Bascuñan 1993).  This Tribunal has recently (since mid-2017) been drawn into the present accountability 
case universe, playing an extremely conservative role and arguably acting beyond its remit. 
Emphasis on strict military discipline and constant rotation of civilian ministers enhanced 
his own power within government, while the distribution of largesse obtained from the 
return of expropriated assets and (later) through deregulation and privatisation kept 
wealthy business interests largely onside, or created new and more pliable economic 
elites. For control, and to some extent also for coordination, there was as we have seen, 
the selective deployment of exemplary coercive violence, first using spurious ‘wartime’ 
legality in the form of courts martial, then moving to extreme, deniable violence 
unleashed by semi-clandestine security services. 
The fact that such violence was, as Policzer (2009) contends, organised and goal 
oriented is confirmed, as he also asserts, by the fact that it was reined in during periods 
when its immediate objectives had been achieved and/ or its benefits were matched or 
outweighed by costs.  He interprets the 1977 dissolution of the DINA secret police, 
replaced by the less deadly, although by no means harmless, Centro Nacional de 
Inteligencia, CNI, in this vein. More broadly, this move was also part of a broader sea 
change which was both reactive and prospective, encompassing high politics (and 
economics) as well as the decision to ratchet down the intensity of repression. Its 
prospective aspects included paving the way for the 1980 Constitution, which gave 
written shape to a bold, transformative political project whose ambitious breadth and 
long-term scope had been foreseen by almost no-one in the early days.  Its reactive 
elements included a specific rearguard action, the replacement of the DINA, to defuse US 
anger at a flagrant, and unauthorised, encroachment of Chilean coercive violence onto 
US soil, in the shape of the 1976 car bomb assassination of prominent Chilean exile 
Orlando Letelier. It is tempting, though it may be optimistic, to believe that this quite 
localised increment in the political costs of continued coercion – caused by sudden 
disapproval from a previously dependable ally – was amplified and augmented by the 
courageous defence of essential rights that was now being mounted in the courts.  Newly-
minted human rights lawyers, mostly under the protection of the Catholic Church, were 
attempting to use law as a brake on regime violence, or at least as a way to denounce that 
violence at home and abroad.  Again, a full account of this quixotic and rather noble 
endeavour escapes the scope of this chapter, but can be found, inter alia, in Lowden 1996, 
Wilde 2015, and Collins 2010a, 2010b. A personal account by an emblematic human 
rights lawyer appeared recently as Hertz (2017), and Hertz and many other key 
protagonists also appear in a 2014 documentary film, Habeas Corpus.  
 For purposes of this chapter, the main question to ask about this undoubtedly 
praiseworthy endeavour of moral – or, in Moustafa’s terms, ´rightful´ resistance is 
whether it changed law, legal practice, or legal practitioners in any measurable or lasting 
way.  Ginsburg and Moustafa (2008) discuss the potential for networks of support or 
complicity to emerge, through everyday interaction, between key actors in authoritarian 
regimes.  Their focus is largely on intra-elite dynamics within regime circles, whereby 
for example, as discussed above, high level regime figures might cultivate and exploit 
affinities with senior judges, and vice versa, with each seeking to shore up their position 
of power, and/or shift the political direction of the regime.  However, complicity can also 
arise, and latent or active networks of sympathy or understanding can be forged, between 
and among judges and other players in the authoritarian game. Since the insulation of 
civilian from military judicial processes, and the compartmentalisation of oversight of 
repression into the latter, was never fully watertight, at least some potential for restraint 
or influence on repressive behaviour through access to ‘regular’ judges remained.  Thus, 
defensive and denunciatory action in both systems was judged a worthwhile endeavour 
by many, though not all, of the newly emerging human rights organisations.23  The 
networks formed by and for such action included novel alliances between the far left and 
the Catholic Church; and thence between radical lawyers and some of their more 
respectable establishment counterparts.   The Christian Democrat political 
background of the latter left them susceptible to appeals from the Cardinal Archbishop or 
his subordinates to work for or assist the legal department of the Vicaría de la Solidaridad, 
the Church’s flagship legal and social assistance organisation.24  The same characteristic, 
and these lawyers’ clear lack of radical sympathies or revolutionary politics also lent 
additional heft to their denunciations of the regime’s more flagrant moral failings.   These 
principled individuals were sadly no more than a handful,25 and although the new human 
rights lawyers, both centre and left, formed their own semi-clandestine support 
organisations, these did not outlive the 1980s.  This burgeoning human rights sensibility 
therefore did not amount to a more complete complicity with, or capture of, bastions of 
                                                          
23 In the early years some refused to supply defence lawyers to the stacked and essentially meaningless 
‘show trials’ of civilians by courts martial, arguing that to do so was to give the instances a veneer of 
legitimacy.  Others however thought it worthwhile attempting to have sentences made more lenient or 
commuted, seeking and sometimes obtaining penalties such as enforced exile instead of life 
imprisonment or worse. 
24 The Vicaría was formed from an earlier ecumenical organisation, the ‘Peace Committee’ (Comité Pro 
Paz) after Pinochet ordered the latter to be dissolved.  The working practices of both were similar.  
25 For more detail, including names, see Fuentes op cit. 
the profession such as the Bar Association.26  Nor did the human rights movement ever 
fully capture public opinion: although egregious abuses certainly became a central 
rallying point for internationally-mobilised opposition to the regime, inside the country, 
regime propaganda depicting victims as few in number and terrorist by nature did much 
to stave off righteous indignation. 
Aside from the nucleus of human rights lawyers, other legal professionals of 
similar respectability did nonetheless begin to come together in search of ways to channel 
legally framed, indeed legally focused, opposition to the regime’s pretensions at 
consolidation.  Many such efforts occurred under the shelter of academic think tanks, to 
escape the ban on official party politics.   Thus as early as 1978, the influential 
‘Constitutional Studies Group’, or ‘Group of 24’, convened jurists and other legally-
literate, regime opponents to draft a democratic alternative to what later became the 1980 
Constitution, the production of which was a critical juncture in the relationship between 
the courts, repressive agencies, economic elites, and the regime. The Group continued to 
meet even after the highly authoritarian Constitution was imposed.  Its members were 
influential at and after transition,27 and in the later years of the regime began to think 
seriously about justice system and judicial reform, an issue which Pinochet himself 
considered one of the regime’s major unfulfilled modernisation agendas.28  
In terms of judicial response to human rights framed opposition– at the supply, 
rather than the demand, end of the legal mobilisation dyad - one might have to conclude 
that the lawyers of the Vicaría were left playing the long game. Despite their best efforts 
to hold the regime to account, no member of the security services or other regime official 
was ever formally convicted of a human rights related crime during the entire 17-year 
duration of the dictatorship.  Nonetheless this does not mean that human rights defence 
in general, and its legal expressions in particular, were to no avail or of no account.  
Sentences were sometimes commuted and the definitive ‘disappearance’ of some 
                                                          
26 McEvoy and Rebouche (2007) point out that methodologically speaking, the attitudes of such collective 
professional bodies are key to understanding the behaviour of key sectors. 
27 They included Enrique Silva Cimma, who went on to be foreign minister to Patricio Aylwin, the country’s 
first elected president after transition (1990-94); Francisco Cumplido, made minister of justice in 1990, 
and Jorge Correa Sutil.  Correa Sutil, then a recent law graduate, would go on to become Dean of the UDP 
Law School, Secretary of the Rettig Commission, undersecretary of the Interior, and judge on the 
Constitutional Tribunal. 
28 After 1985, members of the recently-opened law faculty of the Universidad Diego Portales, UDP, joined 
colleagues from a centrist (Christian Democrat)-led think tank to form the innocuously-named 
Corporation for University Promotion. They discussed future legal reforms, focused on the judicial branch.  
The group included Jorge Correa Sutil, author of an influential account of Chile’s protracted judicial reform 
process (Correa Sutil 1999)   
detainees almost certainly prevented, when it became apparent that their detention was 
known about and had been noted. The information generated by even unsuccessful 
attempts to lodge habeas corpus writs could serve as the basis for denunciation at home 
and abroad, where diaspora networks were key in creating international solidarity 
awareness and condemnation of the regime (Angell 2013). The resulting paper trail can 
and has provided a wealth of usable evidence in the more accommodating accountability 
environment that has prevailed over the past decade or so.  It has also meant that Chilean 
relatives and survivors have faced fewer statute of limitation obstacles than their 
counterparts in some other countries when attempting, in recent times, to trigger the 
opening or re-opening of criminal investigations into decades-old crimes.29 
Another, and less often remarked, effect may be argued, in the shape of mutual 
channels of communication and influence, more often informal than official, between 
opposition lawyers and justice system actors at all levels.  The way the Chilean criminal 
justice system of the time operated meant that denunciations entailed direct interaction 
between putative victims or relatives’ lawyers and the respective judge, magistrate, or 
judge’s clerk.  Police and prosecutors played only a secondary role, and Vicaría lawyers 
who acted as human rights defenders throughout the lifetime of the regime cumulatively 
amassed many hours of access to quite senior judges with whom they had previously 
studied, or to whom they were linked by social ties or even previous friendships.  
Alejandro Gonzalez, long-time head of the Vicaría’s legal team, placed considerable 
emphasis on the importance, for occasional positive outcomes, of these prior complicity 
networks.  He described them as being disrupted, but usefully not always definitively 
broken, when respected legal professionals such as himself appeared before the courts 
lobbying on behalf of the disappeared.30  Thus some judges, often although not always 
low down the hierarchy, could be persuaded or were indeed willing to depart from the 
new norm and refuse to look the other way when cases involving repression came before 
them. While most dutifully renounced jurisdiction to military courts, judge Carlos Cerda 
                                                          
29 See Collins (2010a) for the contrast with El Salvador, and Lessa and Skaar 2016, or the website of the 
Observatorio Luz Ibarburu, for contrasts with Uruguay. 
30 González had been justice minister in the elected Christian Democrat administration (1964-70) that had 
immediately preceded Allende’s socialist government.  He reported, inter alia, the bemusement of a 
former friend and Supreme Court judge who took him aside and asked how much longer he intended to 
‘go on about’ these ‘supposed’ disappearances. The bemused appeal to former camaraderie was, said 
González, apparent throughout his tenure and worked both ways: he himself often traded on it to coax 
some semblance of a correct response in cases he was representing.  Author’s interview with Alejandro 
González, Santiago, 14 January 2003, parts of which are cited in Collins 2010.   
was famously disciplined for refusing to do so.  Other magistrates or judges, including 
Cristian Alfaro, Rene García Villegas, Milton Juica and Sergio Muñoz also took 
occasional or consistent action that was at least in keeping with rule of law principles, 
although never sufficient, as mentioned, to produce pre-1990 criminal convictions.  
Nonetheless Cerda, Juica and Muñoz all later progressed to the heights of the Supreme 
Court, and all held key senior judicial posts at crucial junctures in the post-1990 
accountability trajectory.31 Juica, like other senior judges, has publicly acknowledged on 
various occasions the pivotal role played by dictatorship-era case law in forcing the 
Supreme Court to modernise its approach to international law in general, and international 
human rights law in particular.32 
It might perhaps be argued that the career trajectories of these particular individual 
judges do not per se still merit the designation of them as constituting a ‘complicity 
network’, in Ginsburg and Moustafa’s sense, with human rights lawyers or the human 
rights cause.  Nonetheless it is striking that the substantive accountability ‘turnaround’ of 
Chile since 200433 has been largely overseen by the same judicial system, and indeed the 
same (now more senior) judicial figures, that previously underwrote impunity.  Since 
there has been no significant legislative component to this change – a 1978 Amnesty Law 
has not been repealed or annulled – only changes to judicial behaviour can account for it.  
This change is not universal within the ranks of the judiciary, and the judges most 
associated with it are often the same ones – including those named above - who were 
exposed to the issue through interaction with the Vicaría’s lawyers, and through them 
with victims, in the 1970s and 1980s.  Another cohort of judges, less senior and/or simply 
too young to have been in office during the worst period of repression, has come to the 
issue through assignment, as after 2001 a small group of appeals court level judges, 
                                                          
31 Cerda was president of the Santiago Appeals Court during the 1998 ‘Pinochet cases’ in Chile, and later 
personally investigated financial fraud and corruption charges that proved extremely harmful to the 
dictator’s image amongst right wing politicians and sympathisers. Juica and Munoz both investigated 
emblematic episodes of human rights violations before and after transition, and both serve or have served 
on the Supreme Court criminal bench that today sees all such cases that go to the final stage of appeal.  
Munoz has twice served as the Supreme Court’s designated coordinator for human rights-related 
dictatorship-era cases, most recently in 2016. 
32 Remarks made at a Universidad de Chile conference in 2016, and at a range of events held at the 
Instituto de Estudios Judiciales, IEJ, Santiago, Chile between 2010 and 2013 at the instigation of the 
Observatorio de Justicia Transicional of which this author is the Director. Reports of some events can be 
found online via www.derechoshumanos.udp.cl ; others were held under a version of the Chatham House 
rule and notes are on file with the author.  
33 The date at which the first of Chile’s (now) over 1,000 ongoing and completed dictatorship-era 
accountability cases resulted in successful criminal conviction and imprisonment. 
varying between six and two dozen in number, has been solely or preferentially dedicated 
by the Supreme Court to work on resolving past dictatorship-era cases. This decision, 
taken after the 1998 Pinochet arrest, has concentrated case expertise in a few hands.  In 
so doing, it has created a community of mutual endeavour and understanding between 
human rights case judges and an equally specialised group of specially-designated police 
officers, forensic experts and state-employed human rights lawyers.  These professionals 
demonstrably tend over time to feel closer in professional and personal affinity terms to 
each other, and to relatives and survivors, than to their own professional peers, and thus 
Ginsburg and Moustafa’s appellation of complicity network may be apposite once again 
not only during but after the authoritarian phase.34 Such networks, where they exist, self-
evidently have as much potential as any structural or institutional reform to alter justice 
outcomes by changing legal culture and shaping preferences and understanding (see, inter 
alia, Couso, Huneeus and Sieder, 2010). 
 
4. Transition and its Discontents 
 
Lawyers, or at least politicians versed in law, were certainly instrumental in 
engineering transition itself. One lawyer and politician who played a key role in opening 
up the formal political system once more was Gabriel Valdés, who had been Foreign 
Minister in the reformist 1964-1970 Christian Democrat administration. Returning to 
Chile from self-imposed exile in 1982, Valdés united moderate opposition and sought 
dialogue with the regime. After 1983 protests, however, Pinochet returned to a hard-line 
position, eventually leading to a failed assassination attempt against him in 1986. 
Elements of the civilian right saw the urgent need to develop an exit strategy, and the so 
called ‘National Accord for Transition to a Full Democracy’, Acuerdo Nacional, was 
signed after secret inter-party meetings convened by the Church. Making no specific 
mention of justice sector or legal reforms, the Acuerdo did however set out a 
‘commitment to democratic values’; respect for the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights; a fully elected legislature; possible – but vague - ‘constitutional reform’; 
economic continuity; ‘respect for private property’, and a limited openness to 
accountability for human rights violations (Huneeus 2009). Some of these, including the 
                                                          
34 See, inter alia, Collins (forthcoming, JHRP and in Garbett, and foreword in Osmo, ed.,) for development 
of the argument about post-transitional accountability networking across the state-civil society divide.  
latter, were never fulfilled. Others became the basis for legislative proposals by the first 
transitional administration. 
Political parties were gradually legalized, and most – with the exception of the 
Communist Party – agreed to accept the transition framework that had been laid down by 
the outgoing regime, inter alia in the 1980 Constitution. This dictated a nationwide 
October 1988 plebiscite. Fifty-five percent voted against a further period of Pinochet’s 
rule, but 43 percent voted in favour, showing continuing high levels of popular support 
for the political right and the military. Nonetheless Patricio Aylwin, candidate of the 
centre-left 17-party Concertación coalition, prevailed in the ensuing 1989 presidential 
election. The incoming government’s freedom to act was nonetheless limited by inherited 
constraints. The 1980 Constitution, drawn up by the regime, set out a model of restricted 
democracy (‘democracia tutelada’) and cemented in the principal features of the 
neoliberal economic model. Appointed senators, extremely high voting thresholds for 
constitutional reform, and a binominal electoral system ensured an effective right-wing 
veto in the legislature, while Pinochet was to continue as commander-in-chief of the army 
until 1998.  
Around this same time, Chileans who had just voted against the perpetuation of 
the authoritarian regime nonetheless gave high approval ratings to judges (and the police) 
as ‘people who could be trusted to solve the nation’s problems.’35 This is striking, given 
the direct complicity of both in the outgoing dictatorship. The key may lie in Carlos 
Huneeus’s contention, mentioned above, that the regime, though personalised, was not 
arbitrary. The authoritarian state had built a legally framed and rule-bound edifice whose 
rules were complied with even when they brought about the regime’s own demise.36 The 
courts offered an apparently rational (in the Weberian sense) bureaucracy which could 
claim to rise above, and had certainly outlasted, recent political extremes of all stripes 
(Corte Suprema de Chile 2003). This was perhaps an attractive lodestone for the right, 
the general public, and anyone longing for a still centre in the rapidly turning world of 
Chilean transitional politics. The Concertación played down its previous radical identity, 
promising to play within the rewritten, authoritarian, rules of the game.  In so doing, the 
courts were once again implicitly handed the mantle they had never formally put down: 
                                                          
35 Collins (2013:69). Businesspeople scored even more highly; civilian politicians, poorly.  See also 
Huneeus and Ibarra (2013) for detailed time series work on public opinion surrounding Pinochet and his 
regime. 
36 The Constitution dictated the timing and terms of the 1988 plebiscite.  Though Pinochet wanted to 
disregard the results when he lost, his subordinates and political allies refused to allow him to do so. 
that of disinterested arbiter of the country’s supreme values, guarantor of stability in 
economic and political matters alike. 
Formal accountability for past human rights violations was perhaps the most 
evident casualty of this pacted approach to transition.  Two months after taking office, 
incoming elected president Patricio Aylwin frankly admitted that some of his manifesto 
promises had had to be watered down.  ‘Democratisation’ was now rebranded as the more 
anodyne ‘[reforms to] ‘administration of justice’.  Where pre-election promises had 
spoken of ‘clarify[ing] the truth and do[ing] justice over human rights violations, as an 
ineluctable moral prerequisite for national reconciliation’, (Aylwin n/d), Aylwin now 
appeared to equate the situations of political prisoners and perpetrators. He proposed 
pardoning political prisoners held for non-violent crimes. These proposals, along with 
changes to terrorism legislation and military justice, became known as the ‘Leyes 
Cumplido’ proposal, after the Justice Minister of the day. In congressional debate the 
package was often confused with a broader acuerdo marco (‘general agreement’) that 
was being sought. This agreement in effect traded off pardons for the former armed 
opposition against continued broad amnesty for state agents.  Both proposals were decried 
by the left for drawing tacit moral equivalence between state terror and armed resistance. 
This, plus opposition from the right, proved fatal. The Leyes Cumplido emerged from 
legislative debate in January 1991 significantly weakened in their intended reforming 
effect on military courts or internal security legislation. 
Nonetheless a truth and reconciliation commission (the ‘Rettig Commission’ was 
held, reporting in March 1991. Follow up on delicate topics including relations with the 
military was overseen by an inner circle of Aylwin’s trusted political allies and aides. 
Some figures from the Vicaría circle went on to have substantial specific influence on 
public policy treatment of past crimes. These include José Zalaquett, Chile’s main 
internationally known transitional justice expert, who became associated with a highly 
principled, but largely conciliatory, pro-clemency position. They also included Maria 
Luisa Sepulveda, former Vicaría social work director, who served as a key human rights 
policy advisor to all successive Concertación administrations and was vice-president of 
the subsequent Valech Commission, a second truth commission held in 2004-5 to 
recognise survivors of political imprisonment and torture. The growing gap between these 
policy advisors, seen as elite actors, and grassroots groups disillusioned by the continued 
lack of justice led to distancing and tension. Human rights lawyers from outside 
privileged government circles continued to feel excluded and underappreciated over the 
course of the 1990s.  If anything, their previous contestatory identity was preserved and 
reaffirmed despite the new democratic moment, and for some the sense of betrayal was 
undoubtedly more intense given that the authorities who still failed to deliver on their 
expectations of justice now consisted of their own former comrades. 
Innovation in transitional justice circles occurred mainly through unexpected 
crises or minority social demands impossible to ignore. Both circumstances combined in 
1998, an annus horribilis for Pinochet, an unexpected headache for the government, and 
an equally unexpected source of revitalisation for the dwindling human rights community. 
The year’s events conspired to put Chile back on the world map for the very issue it had 
been trying hard to leave behind: past human rights crimes. In January, two criminal 
complaints were lodged against Pinochet in Chilean courts, seeking principally to express 
disgust at his imminent investiture as an honorary Senator.37 Another significant 
milestone of the year was attributable to cause lawyering by a member of the ‘old guard’ 
of human rights lawyers: a moderately positive verdict in September 1998 reopened a 
previously amnestied case.38 The underlying logic of the ruling allowed many previously 
shelved cases to be reopened: it acknowledged that where ongoing crimes or crimes 
against humanity had been committed, amnesty and statutes of limitation could not be 
legitimately applied. 
Meanwhile, a Spanish investigation into cross-border military repressive 
operations of the 1970s and 80s - known as Operación Cóndor - had begun in 1996. 
Against this backdrop Pinochet was advised by military lawyers not to travel to Europe. 
Nonetheless, travel he did. The main outlines of what followed, including Pinochet´s 
detention in the United Kingdom from October 1998 to March 2000, are well known.39  
For present purposes, the main noteworthy features are various. First, the arrest 
galvanised domestic groups into opening or reviving proceedings of their own against 
Pinochet. When he returned to Chile in March 2000, the main domestic complaint against 
him had expanded to incorporate a group of ten lawyers, representing dozens of victims 
and relatives. The old human rights lawyer circuit was revived, while the sheer volume 
of new cases drew new lawyers into the issue. Relatives, survivors and left-of-centre 
social organisations such as trades unions vied to get in on the act by submitting their own 
                                                          
37 An honour which was due to him under the terms of his own 1980 Constitution. 
38 The long-running ‘Poblete-Cordoba’ case had become largely a personal crusade for ex Vicaría lawyer 
Sergio Concha, who had continued to work the case as a matter of conscience even after the victim’s last 
close relative had died. 
39 See for example Brett (2009), Roht-Arriaza (2006), Davis 2003. 
criminal complaints, which have now produced over 1,000 active criminal cases before 
the courts, with over 150 more resolved.40  Second, the Concertación’s intense pressure 
on Spain and the UK to bring Pinochet home, arguing sovereign immunity or 
humanitarian grounds, enraged critics on the left, increasing determination to achieve 
domestic prosecution. Third, the case led to a new self-consciousness among Chile’s 
judiciary, whose every action was suddenly scrutinised: the probability of domestic 
justice became key to extradition arguments. 
Chile’s revitalised accountability scenario for past crimes has since 1998 
produced new breeds and generations of cause lawyers, much as the dictatorship gave 
rise to the original group. These new human rights lawyers are perhaps even more diverse 
in origin, motivation and political background than were their historical counterparts, and 
involve themselves in a range of emerging issue areas – most notably, gender and 
diversity rights, and environmentalism.  Some ‘cause lawyers’41 have moreover crossed 
over to staff a small but growing number of state-sponsored or state-run human rights 
institutions and bodies, a development of course unthinkable during the authoritarian era. 
In part, these entities represent early transitional promises only recently come to fruition: 
a National Human Rights Institute, Human Rights and Memory Museum, and 
Subsecretariat (Vice-Ministry) of Human Rights, all prefigured in the Truth Commission 
report, have all been installed only since 2010, following protracted negotiations with 
reluctant right wing political parties and forces (Wilde 1999; 2013). 
As far as the courts are concerned, modernising reforms introduced gradually 
from 1996 have produced a prosecutor-driven, more adversarial criminal justice system.  
There has also been a significant albeit still limited opening to international law, and to 
international and regional human rights jurisprudence in particular.42  In 2013, on the 
occasion of the 40th anniversary of the military coup, the Supreme Court finally publicly 
acknowledged its historical ‘debt’ in having failed to protect dictatorship-era rights 
(Observatorio DDHH 2013). Specialised units within the country`s detective police and 
forensic service, formed to contribute to investigations of past human rights crimes, have 
begun to work on other relevant issue areas, and the new National Human Rights Institute 
                                                          
40 See Informe Anual de Derechos Humanos en Chile, Universidad Diego Portales, editions 2010-2017 
inclusive, chapter one, for cumulative qualitative and quantitative analysis of this caseload.  Until 2009, 
all such cases were triggered privately by relatives or survivors. After 2009, the state also began to initiate 
investigations, although solely in respect of disappeared or executed victims.   
41 For a full development of the concept see Sarat and Scheingold (1998). 
42 See Hilbink 2007; Huneeus (2010); Collins (2010a; 2010b;2013). 
has begun in a modest way to fulfil its charter obligations in training of state personnel 
by, inter alia, sponsoring a joint Masters programme for prosecutors, prison officers and 
other justice system personnel.43  Chile has sought to position itself on the regional and 
international stage as a human rights compliant state, seeking and achieving a position on 
the UN Human Rights Council. President Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010 and 2014-18) 
was at the helm of UN Women between her two presidential terms, and is associated 
internationally with gender rights and a strong emphasis on social policy to promote 
equality. 
Notwithstanding these welcome developments, one could not claim that there is a 
widespread positive regard in the country as a whole for human rights precepts and 
principles.  Survey work by the National Institute for Human Rights, and others, shows 
patchy support for human rights ideals and only a hazy grasp of the essentials of the 
concept.44  As in other countries of the region – yet with significantly less empirical 
justification – hard-line law and order discourse is popular, since an exaggerated fear of 
petty crime goes hand in hand with disdain for assertion of the rights of prisoners or 
detainees.  Violent policing of recent student protests and the quasi-militarisation of the 
Southern region, where indigenous Mapuche activists assert traditional land rights in 
opposition to large scale forestry and fisheries, have attracted consistent criticism from 
national and international human rights monitoring groups.    
Concomitantly, there is as yet little sign of a flourishing professional human rights 
field, beyond the limited job openings – almost exclusively for lawyers – in the small 
number of aforementioned state entities. Such jobs tend to be subject to political 
patronage and turnover of presidential administrations, and so there is little opportunity 
to make them the basis for a stable career. The third sector likewise offers mainly short-
term and precarious opportunities for human rights work, with only a few organisations 
– notable among them the gender-focused NGO ‘Humanas’ – managing to thrive.  Chile´s 
recently gained and much-prized status as a member of the OECD ‘club’ of relatively 
wealthy economies perversely perhaps plays against it in this regard: elsewhere in the 
region, even in relatively developed Argentina, many human rights organisations subsist 
                                                          
43 The programme is offered by the Universidad Diego Portales. 
44 See INDH Annual Reports, available on the institution´s website at www.indh.cl and the Public Opinion 
Survey of the Universidad Diego Portales, available at www.encuesta.udp.cl  
on external philanthropic funding which Chile is no longer eligible to receive. Nor is there 
a detectable clamour among the country’s law students to become human rights lawyers.45  
The disincentives include a cultural barrier, as ‘human rights’ is a term with 
limited social acceptance, only recently overcoming an almost exclusive association with 
the abuses of the dictatorship. There are also structural and class barriers: Chile’s higher 
education sector is ruinously expensive, and human rights work offers extremely limited 
earning prospects with which to pay off student loans. Despite all of this, as we have seen, 
a small but identifiable new generation of cause lawyers may be said to be emerging, 
whether working on past accountability cases or other fields including gender, LGBT, 
and/or indigenous rights.  In these newer areas, particularly the more transversal and less 
contested ones, public interest litigation housed in university centres is also beginning to 
be supplemented by a certain amount of pro bono work from established commercial law 
firms.  This may be interpreted as part of a more general dawning awareness among 
Chile’s comfortable private sector of the moral and reputational benefits of corporate 
social responsibility, though as is often the case with such impulses, there is little if any 
underlying drive or support for more radical structural change. Further support for the 
contention that these developments do not really add up to a major sea change or any kind 
of human rights ‘complicity network’ within the legal profession comes when one 
considers that the country’s principal Bar Associations – which are regionally, rather than 
nationally, organised – continue to return conservative committees.  Only in the Santiago 
association was there some move after 2010 toward a more liberalising mood, with a 
concerted decision by a group of liberal lawyers to campaign for a new professional code 
of ethics.  The same Association however most recently elected Olga Feliu, strongly 
associated with right wing politics during the dictatorship era, as its president. 
In the political sphere, successive centre-left governments, alternating since 2010 
with right wing administrations,46 have achieved some milestone rights advances, notably 
                                                          
45 This assertion is based in part on the author´s decade-long experience as a lecturer in the country’s 
higher education sector, including the directorship of a human rights research project which is open to 
student participation. It also draws on broader empirical evidence such as a 2012 consultation meeting 
between academics and the UN Working Group on Enforced Disappearances, at which the consensus 
appeared to be that only five or six law schools in the country at that time offered any substantive human 
rights training, mostly as optional courses. There were almost no course offerings outside law schools. 
The country´s first dedicated Masters programme in human rights was created as recently as 2014, in the 
Universidad Diego Portales, and there are still only two such programmes nationwide. 
46 The centre-left Concertacion held the presidency in unbroken succession between the beginning of 
transition (1990) and 2010, when the right wing candidate Sebastian Pinera was elected to replace 
Michelle Bachelet (2006-10).  Since then, Bachelet and Pinera have once again alternated in the 
for example the 2017 passing of a limited but long-anticipated and highly controversial 
abortion law.   Nonetheless, the overall human rights balance remains one of fulsome 
promises, rarely delivered.  The incoming right-wing administration from 2018 promises 
to be even less enthusiastic about human rights than its 2010-14 predecessor, so further 
substantial progress is unlikely and regression is possible, given the general mood in the 
southern half of the continent, where right wing politics, including an anti-feminism 
backlash, are in the ascendant.  As far as the Constitution is concerned, incremental 
changes were considered significant enough by 2009 for then-president Ricardo Lagos to 
replace Pinochet’s signature – reproduced on all official copies of the Constitution – with 
his own.  Nonetheless, the idea of a need for wholesale replacement of the highly 
authoritarian carta magna has acquired purchase in the recent decade (Fuentes 2010). 
The feeling proceeds from a sense that Chile’s ‘modelo’ – the catch-all term in 
popular parlance for the legal, legislative, economic and social architecture inherited from 
the dictatorship era – is outmoded and/or favours superficial growth and the accentuation 
of privilege, to the detriment of a common good in which it does not really believe (Atria 
et al. 2013). The compulsory privatisation of pensions, which now provide extremely 
meagre returns for most of the working population, has been a particular target of recent 
anger and mass mobilisation. That this feeling is not universal nor even perhaps 
majoritarian is however demonstrated by 2017’s presidential election results.47  A 
constitutional assembly promised by Bachelet in the runup to her second term 
characteristically never materialised, with non-binding ‘popular assemblies’, held to 
supposedly generate ideas for such a scheme, fizzling out as it became clear that there 
was no real will to take the plan further.  It may be argued that the 1980 Constitution, 
whether loved or hated, constitutes an assertion of identity and an effort of (self)-
legitimation that the Concertación, after 1990, was never able to match. The absence of a 
transformative project other than initial unified opposition to Pinochet became evident by 
2010, and the modified Nueva Mayoría coalition after 2014 has not succeeded in 
developing a self-confident alternative foundational narrative.  It is in this sense that one 
might reasonably claim that 1980, as surely as 1973, marked an irrevocable seismic shift 
in Chile’s political and social self-understanding. The longer its precepts persist, the more 
                                                          
presidency (2014-18 and 2018- , respectively), with Bachelet representing a slightly modified coalition 
named the ‘Nueva Mayoria’ in her second term.  
47 The right wing coalition won a comfortable ten point margin over the centre-left candidate in the second 
round of voting, although overall, as in many modern democracies, the winning bloc comprised less than 
50% of the population eligible to vote.  
strongly stability, law, and the established order of things will tend to become associated 
with that constitution and its precepts. It is in this sense that we can observe the ‘overhang’ 
alluded to in the introduction to this chapter. 
 
6. Final Remarks   
 
We have considered, in turn, how courts, law itself, and the constitutional project 
were mutually (re)constituted and (re)configured by contending social actors during and 
after Chile’s 1973-1990 authoritarian ‘rule by law’ period, seeing how even within this 
period an unstable mix of coercion and legality/ legitimacy narratives were used to seek 
consent or enforce acquiescence. In this process law and legal actors, while always active 
shapers of Chile’s public life and recent history, proved not to be a major force for 
fundamental challenge to either the authoritarian takeover per se or the imprint of that 
takeover in more recent post-transitional times. Law appears instead to largely fulfil the 
expectations of Marxist and critical legal theorists, acting as a preserver of existing power 
relations, relations which were recast incipiently – and violently – in 1973 but more 
lastingly in 1980. Confusing stasis with stability, and regarding the latter as self-evidently 
desirable, may be at the heart of this tendency.   
 As we have seen, even vigorous and courageous defence of human rights during 
the worst period of dictatorship-era coercion shared this pro-status-quo, non-radical 
character, inspired as it often was by an avocation for supposedly timeless Chilean virtues 
of legalism and tradition at least among the more ‘respectable’ class of human rights 
lawyer. Thus the complicity to which Ginsburg and Moustafa allude did arise within a 
small group of such lawyers, even stretching to encompass some judicial figures.  The 
courts, then, did become an alternative space for opposition and contention, but this 
contention was largely around the margins of the regime’s most extreme behaviours and 
violence. The goal and the (not inconsiderable) achievements were to contain, mitigate 
and increase the costs of repression, not to more dramatically impede or reverse the 
military takeover or the many, ambitious, socioeconomic transformations which it 
essayed and at which it largely succeeded.  The return to democracy, while certainly not 
fictitious or insignificant, was a change of tone and administration rather than substance, 
with no real appetite on any significant part of the political spectrum for a wholesale 
reversal of the 1980s direction of travel. In such a context Chile’s awakening to the human 
rights cause, while real and rapid, dating almost precisely to the early years of the coup, 
amounts if anything to liberal conservatism rather than radical challenge to the status quo. 
Its significance under a highly (neo)liberal presidency from 2018 may therefore be limited 
to adjustments of language and emphasis rather than acting as any significant brake on or 
impediment to the incoming administration.  ‘Business as usual’ may well become the 
order of the day, although it is not impossible to imagine more vigorous pushback against 
some of the gender and reproductive rights changes of recent times.  Such a scenario 
might conceivably be sufficient to produce a new version – one adapted to democratic 
rather than authoritarian realities – of the tacit alliance or complicity between some cause 
lawyers and some judges that was unfortunately never more than incipient when lives 
were at stake after 1973.  
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